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Home Facts SOA Manuals Counter Intelligence Chapters 4-5
Chapters 4-5 PDF Print E-mail



The application of this chapter will be based on the following main

1. It is essential that some official information be given top
protection in order to safeguard the capability of the nation to protect
itself against all hostile and destructive actions.

2. It is also essential that the citizens of the nation be informed
as much as possible on the activities of the government.

3. This chapter should not be interpreted in any way as trying to
withhold information that otherwise could be publicly disseminated.


A. DEFINITION OF DOCUMENT SECURITY: The degree of protection given to
certain official information for the safekeeping of the nation's capability to
protect itself against hostile or destructive actions.

B. All personnel must be aware that the above-mentioned principles are the
fundamental factors that govern military security and must be deeply
indoctrinated so as to be inherent with the routine performance of their


1. Categories of Classification

a. The official information requiring protection in the
interest of national defense will be limited to three categories of
classification, which are, in order of importance, TOP SECRET, SECRET and
CONFIDENTIAL. No other designations shall be used to classify information of
national defense.

2. Other Definitions

a. Information of Defense. It pertains the official information
that requires protection in the interest of national defense that is not of
common knowledge, y which could be valuable military information for a
potential enemy, to plan or sustain war or insurgency against us or our

b. Classified Material. It is the official information which
has been classified and marked with one of the categories mentioned above.



c. Access to Classified Material. It allows access to
classified material only to those persons authorized to work with classified
information and need to know such information to be able to accomplish their
official duties.

d. Custody. Is the person in possession or that has the
responsibility of protecting and accounting for classified material.

e. Inventory. It is the procedure used to account for
classified material by control of entry and record of the document, or entry
of destruction record, or by signed receipts.

f. Document. Is any recorded information, without considering
its form or characteristics, and includes, without being limited to, the

(1) Handwritten, typewritten or printed material.

(2) All drawn, painted or engraved material.

(3) All sound recordings, voices, tapes or records.

(4) All types of photographs and films, in negatives or
processed, fixed or in motion.

g. Authority for Derived Classification: It is the authority to
classify material as a result of being connected to, or in response to other
material related to the same subject of an already classified material.

h. Material: Means any document, product or substance, on or
within which information can be recorded or included.

i. Properly authorized person: It is a person who has been
authorized to work with classified information, according to the established

3. TOP SECRET Information. Top Secret classification is limited to
the information of defense or material that require the highest degree of
protection. TOP SECRET information will be applicable only to that kind of
information or material that is extremely important for defense, and the
unauthorized disclosure of which would result in serious danger for the
nation, as for example:

a. Definite severance of diplomatic relationships, that would
damage the defense of the nation; [leading) to an armed attack against them or
their allies or to a war.




b. Compromise the military defense plans, or the operations of
military intelligence, or technical or scientific developments vital for the
national defense.

c. As examples of this type of information, there are:

(1) A strategic plan that documents the complete
operations of war.

(2) The documents for war planning.

(3) Plan of operations for an independent operation, or
for a series of coordinated operations.

(4) Documents of military intelligence containing complete
information of a nature that would reveal a big effort of military
intelligence activities by the nation, and that would enable unauthorized
persons to evaluate the success obtained by the military intelligence services
of the nation.

(5) Plans or programs to carry out operations of military
intelligence, or other special operations, when the knowledge of a particular
plan, program or operation would result extremely damaging for the nation.

(6) Important information regarding equipment (war
materiel) extremely important and radically new, whose technical development
constitute vital information for the defense of the nation.

4. SECRET Information. The use of SECRET classification will be
limited to defense or material information whose unauthorized dissemination
could result in serious damage for the nation, such as:

a. Jeopardize international relations of the country.

b. Endanger the effectiveness of a program or policy vitally
important for the national defense.

c. Compromises important military plans for the defense or the
technical development for the national defense.

d. Reveals important operations of military intelligence.

e. Examples of this type of information are:

(1) A war plan or a complete plan for a future war
operation not included under the TOP SECRET classification, and documents that
indicate the disposition of our forces, whose unauthorized publication, by
itself, could compromise such secret plans.




(2) Defense plans and other military plans not included
under the TOP SECRET classification, or in the previous paragraph, that
contain plans and development programs or acquisitions, although they do not
necessary include all the emergency plans.

(3) Specific intelligence that, by itself, could reveal
the military capability of degree of preparation of the Armed Forces, but does
not include information whose unauthorized disclosure could compromise a TOP
SECRET plan.

(4) Intelligence that reveals the strength of our forces
involved in war operations; quantity or quality of equipment, or the quantity
or composition of the units in a theater of operations or other geographic
area where our forces might be involved in war operations. During peacetime,
the information that would reveal the strength, identify, composition or
situation of units usually would not require SECRET classification.

(5) Military intelligence or other information whose value
depends on concealing the fact that the nations possesses it.

(6) Details or specific information related to new
material, or modification of material that reveal important military advances,
or new technical development that has direct application of vital importance
for the national defense.

(7) Security measure for communication or cryptographic
material that reveals vitally important information for the national defense.

(8) Intelligence of vital importance for the national
defense, with regard to amounts of war reserves.

classification will be limited to defense information and to the material
whose unauthorized disclosure could be damaging to the interests of the
national defense. As examples of this type of material, there are:

(1) Reports of operations and battles that might have
valuable information for the enemy (The Essential Elements of Friendly

(2) Reports that contain military intelligence, no matter
what type of information.

(3) Frequencies of military radios and call signals that
have special meaning assigned, or those that are frequently changed because of
security reasons.

(4) Devices and material related to the communications




(5) Information that indicates the assets of our ground,
sea and air forces in national territory or abroad, or the composition of the
units, or que quantity of specific equipment units that belong to them. During
peace time a defense classification is not necessary unless such information
reflects the numbers of the total assets or quantity of weapons whose
characteristics are themselves classified.

(6) The documents or manuals that contain technical
information used for training, maintenance or inspection of classified war

(7) Doctrine of tactical or technical operations.

(8) The investigation, development, production and
acquisition of war materiel.

f. Handling of classified documents

(1) Protection of classified material in the hands of
persons that are travelling.

(a) A person receiving travel orders, and who is
authorized to carry classified material, will protect such material by the
following methods:

1- He will contact his commander in order to
obtain, if available, the corresponding means of protection, according to the
particular classification of the material, or;

2- Will keep the material under his personal
control continuously. It is the responsibility of the carrier of classified
material to use his best judgement for his actions, in order to avoid risky
situations that might compromise the classified material.

(b) The personnel on travel mission will not carry
classified material when crossing international borders where the classified
material might be subject to scrutiny by Customs inspectors or other
"unauthorized" persons. Such material, when forwarded previously by diplomatic
pouch or by mail, will not encounter any obstacles on its way.

(2) Covers of classified material.

The cover of classified material is used to call the
attention of the personnel handling it, to the fact that it is a classified
document, and to protect it against unauthorized scrutiny. The cover shall
have the stamp identifying the classification of the document.

(3) Destruction in case of emergency.




(a) Plans

The commanders and chiefs that are responsible
for the protection of classified material will make formal plans for the
destruction or safe transfer of all classified material under its
jurisdiction, in case of civilian disturbance, disaster, or enemy action.

(b) On board aircraft or ships

If the aircraft carrying classified material is
forced to land, or a ship runs aground in unfriendly or neutral territory
where capture seems imminent, or in other circumstances when it appears that
the material should be destroyed so as not to be recognized, it is preferable
to burn it or destroy it in a way that will not be recognizable.

(4) Security of the typewriter ribbons: The typewriter
ribbons, whether made of cotton, rayon, paper, or silk, which are used to
write classified information are not safe until they have been written over
twice. Presently, many of the ribbons for typewriter machines can only be used
once, therefore have in mind that the impression of letters remain in the
ribbons and these are significantly valuable for the enemy as is the paper in
which the information was typed. These ribbons should be protected

(5) Classified trash: Trash such as drafts, minutes,
notes, dictaphone recordings, or other recordings, typewriter ribbons, carbon
paper, rolls of film, and similar articles, containing information of national
defense, shall be protected by a responsible person, according to their
classification, until they can be destroyed in an orderly fashion the same as
for material of similar classification. It is necessary to have a certificate
of destruction.







The purpose of this chapter is to enable you to plan and carry out
Liaison with Government and civilian Agencies for collection of
information/intelligence required, in compliance with the commanders
requirements, without losing a mutual confidence with the Source.


A. Before carrying out a Liaison, it has to be determined first which
agency or source will be contacted and the purpose for the contact:

1. Liaison could be carried out with the following sources or
a. Government agencies
b. Military units or agencies
c. Civilian agencies and industry

2. The purposes for carrying out the liaison are:

a. To establish a relationship of mutual confidence between the
various government agencies.

b. To develop sources of information for immediate or future

c. To collect and exchange information that might be useful for
future investigation.

d. To obtain assistance in investigations or CI operations.

B. With this in mind, there are two forms or types of Liaison that
can be carried out:


1. Formal liaison is carried out to obtain:

a. Specific information for an ongoing investigation.

b. Information related to security violations.

c. Information of threats to the national security.

2. Informal Liaison is carried out to:




a. Establish a relationship of mutual confidence.

b. Develop Sources.

c. Obtain information related to specific investigations.

d. Obtain information that has not been requested
specifically but is related to one or more incidents or investigations.

e. Maintain friendly relationship among the Sources of
information and the CI agents.

C. Before starting a liaison, you should review the SOP of the unit to
determine the proper Liaison procedure in your area of operations.

D. Upon reviewing the SOP you should determine the requirements and
establish priorities according to the SOP. Some of these areas are:

1. The priority of intelligence requirements are selected by the
Commander, higher authority or by the mission.

2. The requirements are generated by the direction taken by the

3. The priorities that have been established based on the
recommendations by the Commander or the urgency of the mission.

E. Once the requirements have been reviewed, you can establish the liaison

1. There are three basic methods to establish a contact, and these

a. Personal Approach: This is done by the person (Agent)
actually carrying out the liaison with the Source. This individual (Agent)
introduces personally the new Agent to the Source. This method is preferred
because it has the advantage of transferring the credibility and confidence of
the old Agent directly to the new Agent or contact.

b. Introductory letter: In this method the new Agent obtains a
letter of introduction from a person or old Agent that knows the Source. This
letter is presented to the Source during the first contact. The other method
of introduction letter is to send a letter to the Source indicating that you
wish to visit him.

c. Cold Approach. This is the least effective method since it
involved making the initial contact with a strange person. The first visit of
this approach should always be on a social level and must be a short one.




2. When you have not done any personal contact with the Source, you
must take into consideration the following:

a. The Agent must introduce himself and present his official
credentials identifying him as a Special Agent of Officer of Military

b. Indicate the purpose of the visit.

c. Based on your personal observation of the Source's reaction,
determine if a casual conversation is appropriate.

d. As the Agent you must be alert all the time to the signals
by the Source that might indicate what kind of approach is better to use with
the Source.

e. The Agent must be cordial, professional and sincere.

f. Must show respect for the position or profession of the

3. If there has been a previous personal contact with the Source, the
actions of the Agent could be more relaxed (calm) according to the
relationship established by previous contacts.

F. During the liaison, you must establish a Relationship of Mutual
Confidence in order to:

1. Establish cooperation between you and the Source. A great deal of
precaution should be used to develop the Source's willingness to cooperate,
because you do not want to compromise the Source.

2. Have in mind that you can obtain information from previous liaison
reports and other documentation that may assist you in determining the type of
approach that would be best for the Source in particular in order to:

a. Adopt the proper attitude.

b. Be ready to change attitude if it is necessary. As the
Source calms down and starts to cooperate, a more relaxed attitude could be

3. One of the techniques that you can use is to deal with subjects of
mutual interest.

EXAMPLE: "If a person is a football fanatic, he would very
receptive to talk about that sport instead of another sport that he does not
know, or does not care to about."




4. During the liaison contact you must show sincere interest in the
Source's opinions. If the Agent shows that his (Agent's) opinion is better
than the Source's, you might lose the Source's confidence.

5. It is important, also, that you study well the capabilities of the
Source before asking him for information. This might embarrass the Source if a
request is made that he cannot fulfill.

6. You must always be aware of the jealousy existing among the
various Agencies. And remember always that you do not have to compare the
effectiveness of one Agency against the other, this could cause a serious
problem because the Source could also be providing information to other
agencies where you might also have another contact.

7. During the Liaison contact, maintain always your position as a CI
Special Agent and do not fall into discussion of military ranking; this is
very important because you are a direct representative of the government.

8. If you do not have any previous knowledge of the Source, establish
the contact and mutual confidence in the manner already discussed. In this
situation, maintain flexibility and allow the circumstances to dictate on the
approach that can be used with the Source.

G. During the liaison contact there will be instances when information of
mutual interest will be exchanged.

1. Before exchanging such information, first determine if that
information can be divulged. Consider the following points as basis for such

a. Whether the information does not violate the SOP

b. Whether it is classified and cannot be divulged among other
agencies, even if they are part of the Government.

NOTE: The exchange of information is important because if you only
obtain information and does not offer certain information in return there is
the possibility of losing the Source's confidence.

2. The Liaison contact can be considered successful when:

a. both parts involved in the Liaison decide or discuss the
exchange of information.

b. both parts can use the information exchanged to their


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