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Home Facts SOA Manuals Handling of Sources CHAPTER IX

In the last chapter about individual security and on cell
security, it was learned how important is to strictly follow
certain established methods, techniques and principles. It was
also learned that in order to achieve a secure and effective
network of employees, we must maintain their action controlled on
the bassi of a careful analysis and appropriate planning.
Consequently, the CI agent must plan and initiate the scrutiny of
the employees in order to make certain that all members of the
network submit to established discipline; it also serves to prevent
employees from acting on their own, allows to test the honesty, to
determine the level of training and what additional training is
necessary. Finally, but no less important, serves to frustrate the
attempts on the part of. the guerrillas to penetrate the agent's
activity and subsequently subvert his employees inducing them to
cooperate with the opposition. As it can be seen, the scrutiny of
the employee is carried out by many different techniques. At this
time we shall deal with the subject of when, under what
circumstances, how and for what purpose the agent begins the
scrutiny of the employees. During the presentation it would be
possible to determine that we are not personnel dedicated to test
only the activities of the employees, but we also have to test the
communication lines, hiding places, and convenience addresses.


1. In talking about scrutiny of the employees in general terms,
we must consider the following factors: First, what other activity
has to do with the employees, the scrutiny of these must be carried
out under a proper control. Each inquiry must be planned in such
a way that it serves to verify or produce a specific fact or facts.
Thus, each inquiry and the corresponding results must be recorded
and the archives verified before beginning a new probe. Fourth,
the inquiry must be valid, that is to say, must be prepared in such
a way that the produced results are positive or negative in nature.


a. Due to the nature itself and purpose of the scrutiny of
the employees, the methods and techniques of the inquiry shall be
different for each employee and for different areas. The methods
and techniques will depend on the history of the employee or
employees submitted to scrutiny, the availability of certain
facilities and requirements and local directives. In the scrutiny
of the employees, development of harmony must be a continuous
process. Every evaluation must be backed through a verification.



b. We already have said that the methods for the scrutiny
of employees varies from one area to another. Why do they vary?

c. Now we shall speak of the following problem which
certainly is more than enough linked to the first# that is, take
into consideration the history of the employee.

Why is this consideration important?
d. In order to illustrate what was said before, let Is
look at the following example: We suppose that we are checking an
employee to determine the voracity of his statements. in order to
do this we solicit a simple inquiry. We interrogate the individual
carefully and make precise annotations of his statements. Few days
later we interrogate the employee again asking the same questions.
If we find discrepancies between the two statements, it can be
assumed that there is a possible deception. However, in order to
have valid proof, we must take into consideration the education
level and intelligence of the interested, because it impossible
that a person with little education or little intelligence to
forget some facts, could have misinterpreted then or even relate
them falsely, which could produce discrepancies in his statements.
If the case is so, must not think that the individual is
intentionally lying. On the other hand, in the case of a more
intelligent individual, such discrepancies could very well be
indicative of intentional deception.

e. The third determining factor for this type of inquiries and
methods to be used is the availability of means to conduct the
scrutiny of the employees, like all other intelligence activities,
it must be a well planned activity. before examining an employee it
is imperative to consider many factors and to compile numerous
operational data.

2. inquiring methods. The agent has available the following
three types of inquiries:

a. Investigative inquiry

b. Mental examination

c. Mechanical examination.


1) We shall analyze the first type, the investigative
inquiry. Like in any other type of testing, in order to
investigate it is necessary to have certain pertinent data. In
order to obtained the desired information previously planned
questions are asked. The answers are noted and in their turn these
are examined and compared with other specific data. This way the
veracity of the first statement can be determined. We must
remember one thing during friendly character interrogations, the CI



agent will always take the initiative to ask the questions. He
must never accept as true the statement of an employee if first he
has not examine it and proven to be true. One must remember that
we are not newspaper reporters in search for a sensational story,
we are counterintelligence agents in search of concrete facts. it
is imperative to keep in mind, that even in dealing with an old
employees he must be subjected to scrutiny, his statements must be
investigated and his honesty determined. Must never accept the
statement of an employee without verifying it first. The problem
is to do the verification without damaging the harmony already
developed. The desired success is to make the employee understand
that the direct interrogatory is a routine matter, which is a good
system, and it is necessary to fulfil the mission, as well as to
protect him and the rest of the personnel. The employee must be
made to see that one is testing the operational matters not because
of lack of confidence in him, but more so for the purpose of
guaranteeing his own personal safety, that is to say, to make
certain that he is not discovered by the opposition. Every agent
must understand that operational control measures, including
scrutiny of the employees, in rare occasions are conducted not only
for investigating the employee personally, but even more so serve
as a means to sustain him because of the guerrillas, as well as to
protect the members of the network.

2) The Investigative inquiry.

Not every employee who may have been dishonest is a guerrilla
sympathizer. The reasons for the lack of honesty are many. Some
employees lie in order to obtain monetary gain, to cover mistakes,
or to appear that they are not afraid. But whatever the reason may
be, in order to protect our mission, it is our duty to discover the
absence of honesty wherever and-when it occurs. The professional
counterintelligence agent must constantly analyze his employees, he
must try to detect in them any indications of having too much
confidence or of being afraid. Once this is done,- he must
discover the cause and give a solution to the problem. Security
imposes this duty on the agent.

3) We illustrate this point as a true case that occurred during
an operation. The employee was an old lady, who worked as a nurse
and who during a revolt succeeded to enter as such in the area.
She had succeeded to recruit a local employee ( a resident in the
area of the guerrillas) who agreed to supply information about the
movements of the guerrilla forces. Naturally, the employee was
supplied with pertinent date from the new employee. The
appropriate checking of the archives was made but the results were
negative. A little time later a new employee became quite
productive. Every month the nurse in question made trips in the
area of the guerrillas where she remained two or three days.. on
returning from these trips, she stated of having established a
hiding place near the village of the employee in which he planted
the information. The nurse reported to the counterintelligence



agent all the details of the hiding place as well as the
circumstances of collection. The counterintelligence agent was
satisfied with the report until he realized that the nurse had not
provided sufficient details in regards to her trip in the area, nor
how she had established the hiding place, that is to may, how she
did the trip, the distance, ate. The supervisor of the
counterintelligence agent mentioned this matter to his and they
agreed that in the next visit the agent would obtain the pertinent

He was agreeable to the suggestion since in this manner he would
eliminate any doubt his supervisor could have about the nurser. It
is unnecessary to say that when the lady in question supplied all
the required details, it was easy to determine that she had not
established any hiding place in the guerrilla area. She showed the
hiding place on the map and indicated that she had made the round
trip by foot to said place using the same route and with a duration
of time of four hours. After which the CI agent measured the
distance between the town and the hiding place, which convinced him
that the nurse had lied, because it was impossible to have made the
trip in four hours. It was possible to determine through an
investigation that the nurse had acted operationally dishonest.
She had recruited a local employee who had agreed to cooperate, but
a little time later he was forced to leave the area by the
guerrillas. The nurse thought that because of the fact of having
lost her employee, she could also lose her employment.
Consequently, she opted to lie about the operation. The
information which she provided was invented in the friendly area,
and not like she had stated before, when she stated that the events
occurred in the area controlled by the guerrillas. Taking a firm
stand in the basic problem, that is, the scrutiny of the employees,
we can clearly see that the truth is developed by the investigative
actions: First, through detailed debriefing and second on making a
comparison between the information and other available operational

4) Now I will give you another interesting case to illustrate
this point. An intelligence agency relied on a very reliable
employee, who for some time had supplied valuable intelligence
information. He was an employee easy to control and very
disciplined. His reports were always detailed and exact. It is
easy to understand why the counterintelligence agent as well as the
group supervisor held this employee in high esteem. With time the
counterintelligence agent was assigned to a new post, and he was
replaced by another agent. The new agent studied the file of the
employee in question and was able to tell that in effect the
individual was a highly productive source of information, and
according to operational reports, he was also an honest employee.
He noted that the file was up to date, but he opted to have it as
complete as possible. It would be preferable to prepare a new
Declaration of Personal History (DPH). The agent took this
occasion to compare the old DPH with the new. The agent



interviewed the employee and prepared the DPH. He began with the
years of youth of the employee and annotated all the corresponding
detains, he took note of the employees military service, including
the period he was prisoner of war of the Soviets, as well as his
record as such. There was nothing derogatory in the new DPH, even
during the interrogatory the e-the employee left the agent
completely satisfied. When the agent returned to his office, he
again reviewed and studied the DPH. This time, the name of the
city Tallin in the Soviet Union drew his attention. In his
statement the employee had stated that he had been a military
personnel prisoner in various prisoner carps. He also said that in
1944 he and others were moved to Tallin. The agent agreed that
Tallin bad a special significance, but he could not remember
exactly what it was. For that reason, he reviewed the archives and
found what he was looking for. According to reliable reports, the
soviets transferred to Tallin only prisoners selected to be trained
in brain washing. Also had been reported that a number of
graduates were recruited by the Soviet Intelligence Service to
serve as clandestine informants.

5) With this information at his disposal, the
counterintelligence agent began his task. Before much time had
elapsed the employee admitted that he was a soviet informant, whose
special mission was to infiltrate the government intelligence
agencies. He also admitted that the information which he had been
supplying had been received through his control agent and that all
was false. One can observe that this type of problems are not easy
to resolve, there is no easy way of determining when an employee
does not tell the truth. We must keep in mind one thing, a trained
double employee does not act as such. He also appears as a
valuable employee, the most disciplined and the most honest.
Therefore, it is necessary to check the whole world - all the
employees under your control, regardless of what contributions they
have made before or what are the positive factors in their favor.
The method and the technique that have to be employed will depend
on the case, the history of the individual and means available.
Everything must be used, but most than anything logic; must be
objective and use common sense. One must not develop
sentimentalism for his employees and must not let be influenced by
beliefs or false illusions. The agent must maintain the control
and security making use of planning, scrutiny and his professional-
ability. Now we shall speak about other types of investigative
actions that we could use in the scrutiny of our employees. In the
first place are the surveillance and coutersurveillance.

When we meet with our employees we must ask the following

a) Has the counterintelligence agent been followed to the
place of the meeting?

b) Has the employee been followed (watched) to the place of
the meeting?



c) Is the place of the meeting under surveillance?

6) In order to obtain answers to these questions and to test our
employee, we must make arrangements to establish the surveillance
and countersurveillance. The surveillance can be established in
two ways: simple, conducted by the CI agent himself or complex
conducted with the assistance of a surveillance team.

7) Other scrutiny methods could include the following: we
suppose that a CI agent wishes to check if his employee keeps files
of supplied information or not. This fact constitutes a serious
operational violation which must be prevented for various reasons:
First, it could be that the employee is selling the information
either to another friendly intelligence agency or to guerrillas.
Second, the employee perhaps maintains his files for the purpose of
pressuring the agent later. Third, perhaps the employee wishes to
maintain his file with no apparent reason. In any case, the CI
agent must make certain that the employee does not keep any files.
A simple way to discover this is the following: The CI agent tells
the employee that on rendering his last report to his superior ( of
the agent) it was necessary to send it without having time to study
it. The he asks the employee for a copy of the previous report in
order to analyze it. If the employee promises and delivers the
requested information in the next appointment, the CI agent must
determine if the report is a word for word copy of the original.
If this is the case, the agent will be reasonably certain that the
employee prepared the report copying it from a copy he kept. There
are various ways of making this test and one could have his own
ideas of doing it.

8) Another method of checking is to assign the employee to areas
already known. Through this method it could be determined if the
employee has entered in the indicated area or not, it could also be
determined if he observes things well and how well is to carry out
orders as well as to absorb training.

Another method that could be used is to assign the employee
fictitious tasks, this way could corroborate his honesty and
loyalty that he may have. This method is excellent for those cases
where the employee is suspected of. having been preparing false


a. There is a number of tests that could provide us an
indication about the stability and psychologic reaction of the


The ancient romans had a saying " in vino veritras" there is
truth in wine - with that they wanted to say



that a drunk man reveals his true thoughts and his real reactions.
It we observe our employee drinking or in a drunken state, we could
learn much about him.


An excellent way to prove honesty is the following: In paying
the employee pretend to make an error in counting and pay him more.
If ha is honest and realizes that ha has been paid more, he should
state that there is a mistake in the payment, if he remains silent
then it can be deduced that the employee is dishonest.


If it is necessary to determine how the employee would react on
being under tension or pressure, one could provoke the situation to
create such conditions. A situation could be created in which the
employee is made to believe that he has lost something valuable.
His reaction would be a clear indication of how he would act under
real conditions. Another type of important reaction test is the
test done to determine if the employee has the aptitude to sustain
his false identity. We already have learned that the employee must
live under an identity. Consequently, use the reaction test to
make certain that in case the employee is interrogated by the
guerrillas or their supporters, he will not reveal unintentionally
his true identity, or also in the event he has to pass through a
control post he is not going to do the same or arise suspicions by
acting nervously.

In order to test the attitude and reaction of the employee, one
could simulate such conditions. For example, he could be awaken up
during the night and be asked questions about his identity. In
certain cases it could reach the extreme and simulate an arrest to
see how he will react under adverse conditions.


a. I am going to mention some of the mechanical methods to
test, which could be used under certain extenuating circumstances.
Sodiopentathol compound, which is an anesthetic and hypnotic drug,
it could be intravenously injected and would have results of a
"truth serum". In the majority of cases the agent would have to
have a clinic or a hospital at his disposal to make the injection.
In addition, he would have to be aided by health specialists.
Another method that can be used is hypnotism. For the test through
hypnotism you will also need to depend on highly trained personnel.
We must keep in mind that even with the personnel and necessary
means, these methods cannot be used indiscriminately. Such tests
must be done only if the operation specially requires it and if
such process has been approved by a duly authorized headquarters.




a. The employe Is evaluation is conducted on the basis of the
opinion formulated by the agent about the employee, of the scrutiny
results, and the general evaluation which the agent prepares about
the employee Is performance. The counterintelligence agent at the
level of the activities area does not evaluate the product, that
is, the intelligence information. He only evaluates the
credibility, reliability, honesty, integrity and intelligence of
the employee, as well as the validity of the operation. Through a
careful evaluation and careful analysis of the employee by the
agent, the higher headquarters determines the veracity of the
information submitted by the employee. As it was already explained
during the instruction about contacts, the counterintelligence
agent forms an opinion about the employee, first, by means of a DPH
analysis and second, through personal contact. During the meetings
the agent makes use of the previously mention tests to be able to
form a more concrete opinion about the employee'. He must test all
aspects of the employee's situation, he also must verify the
training condition and his intelligence, since in reality only
through an adequate scrutiny he can evaluate the employee.


In this chapter we have discussed the different types of tests
that the employees could be submitted to and which we make use to
prevent the guerrillas from penetrating our ranks. Said tests
serve also to prevent swindlers and information traffickers to
impose on US.

We must keep in mind that the tests are not more than aids for
the agent. The tests do not replace in any way common sense and
intuitive knowledge, nor have to serve as support, that is to lean
on. Even the best test does not serve anything if the results are
not properly revaluated, said test will not have any validity
either unless it is correctly applied or if it is not the test
corresponding to the case in question. Often a single test is not
enough to achieve satisfactory results. Normally will be necessary
to depend on more than one test as well as with different types of
tests. Most of all, we must remember that employee who passes the
test with negative results will have to be Submitted to other tests
one way or another, so that the counterintelligence agent can
properly formulate his opinion.

We must be concern ourselves of the employee who is efficient and
disciplined and not the one who makes mistakes and does not
produce. If the guerrillas sent us one of their penetration
agents, he will do all that is possible to be very efficient and so
outstanding, in order not to give reason to suspect him. In
certain occasions, when a counterintelligence agent was ordered to
submit his employee to a scrutiny, he responded : "Him?" But he is
my right hand man I have more confidence in him than I have on some



of my work colleagues". A little time later said
counterintelligence agent , had to submit his employee to a test.
What were the results? As you may have guessed, the employee had
been working for the guerrillas for some time.


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